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awareness have on their later ability to
recall it? People confront this situation all
the time, whether one’s goal is to simply
avoid a mildly distracting thought, or to
prevent oneself from being overwhelmed
by unpleasant remindings. That people
engage in such behavior is self-evident, 
but its consequences for episodic memory
are not. What our work shows is that with
time, and repeated effort, trying to keep an
unwanted memory out of awareness does
under some circumstances render that
memory less accessible, even when people
want to recall it. These findings have clear
relevance to motivated forgetting.
Kihlstrom’s letter also questions the
potency of the suppression effect reported
in the Nature article. Kihlstrom notes that
after many suppression attempts, subjects
could still recall many of the word pairs,
suggesting that suppression was not very
effective. This observation is misleading.
Although subjects attempted to suppress
items as many as 16 times, each attempt
lasted only 4 seconds, with the total time
spent suppressing an item barely exceeding
one minute. That after such a brief interval,
subjects were up to 10% worse at recalling
the memories suggests a very effective
process. Furthermore, the tendency
reported in the article was for suppression
to increase with repetitions. In naturalistic
cases of memory avoidance, people are
likely to persist in suppressing unwanted
memories for more protracted periods than
we tested in our study. Thus, there is ample
reason to suspect that suppression can be
effective with sustained effort.
However, it is also important to
highlight what the work does not establish.
We agree with Kihlstrom on several points.
First, our work does not demonstrate
unconscious repression. Those clinicians
who believe in the instantaneous and
automatic thrusting of traumatic memories
into the unconscious will find little support
in our work. Indeed, we suspect that most
cases of motivated forgetting arise from
persisting attempts to control awareness
strategically. Second, our work does not yet
establish whether inhibitory control
processes are effective for emotionally
charged memories. Undoubtedly,
emotionally charged memories will be more
intrusive and more difficult to suppress.
Nevertheless, we suspect that emotional
and neutral memories differ primarily in
their degrees of intrusiveness, and that
with time and persistence even emotional
memories may be subject to suppression.
Some will disagree with the above
conjectures. Such disagreement is
reasonable, and we would like to encourage
the field to pursue these questions
empirically. What seems less useful is to
classify repression as a myth and to
discourage scientists from careful inquiry
into its properties. Whether the processes
reported in [5] and reviewed in [1] account
for real cases of motivated forgetting is
ultimately an empirical question that
seems quite worthwhile to pursue.
Michael C. Anderson
Benjamin Levy
Dept of Psychology, 1227 University of
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The claim that language affects thought –
the ‘Whorfian Hypothesis’– has a long
history, and over the years has elicited
strong support as well as fierce criticism.
Gallistel [1] reviewed some recent studies
that tested the Whorfian hypothesis in the
spatial domain, that is, whether
differences in spatial language affected
non-linguistic conceptualization of space.
Languages differ in the frames of
reference used for describing spatial
locations. Three distinct frames of reference
have been identified: intrinsic, absolute and
relative [2]. Some languages only use one 
of these, whereas others might use a
combination of two, or even all three.
Pederson et al. conducted a series of
experiments demonstrating that speakers
of a relative-frame language differed in
their performance in a memory task from
speakers of an absolute-frame language [3].
When asked to recall and reproduce a
display of toy animals, relative-frame
speakers reproduced the display consistent
with a relative frame of reference, whereas
absolute speakers reproduced it in an
absolute frame. This result is consistent
with the Whorfian hypothesis. However, in
a recent study, Li and Gleitman [4] argued
that there was a confound in the Pederson
et al. study. Li and Gleitman claimed that
the difference in recall between the different
language groups was due to the conditions
in which the groups were tested: indoors
versus outdoors. They presented empirical
evidence that appeared to show that the
differences Pederson et al., reported were
due to environmental features rather than
differences between the languages.
However, since Gallistel’s report,
Levinson et al. [5] have published an
article that refutes Li and Gleitman’s
claims. First, they show that across the
language groups that Pederson et al.
tested there was no confounding of test
location: speakers behaved in accordance
with the frame of reference of their
language, regardless of whether they 
were tested indoors or outdoors. This is
counter to the claims of Li and Gleitman.
Secondly, they show that Li and Gleitman
confounded absolute and intrinsic frames
of reference in the experiments that they
themselves conducted. When Levinson et al.
made the appropriate distinction between
these two frames of reference, and tested
Dutch speakers, they found that Dutch
speakers only ever responded in a way
that was consistent with the way their
language codes space. No environmental
manipulation made Dutch speakers
change to an absolute coding of space.
Again, this is counter to the evidence
presented by Li and Gleitman.
Gallistel wrote that all human beings
perceive space in the same way and
neurally encode space in the same way;
furthermore, he stated that the brain has to
encode spatial relations in several different
coordinate frameworks. Given these facts,
he asked how Whorfian effects would be
instantiated in the brain. There are two
important points to note about this. 
First, neither Pederson et al. nor
Levinson et al. make any claims about the
perceptual abilities of different language
groups; their claims are about conceptual
representations. The claim is that the
habitual use of particular linguistic
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concepts modifies non-linguistic concepts.
This is not such a surprising claim.
Numerous studies in categorization 
have shown that experts have different
underlying representations of their domain
of expertise than novices – be it reading
chest x-rays [6], sexing chickens [7], 
or categorizing musical instruments [8].
Experts use more subtle and differentiated
features within their expert domain [9].
Nobody claims that experts could not
categorize using the features that novices
use – it is just that they do not. In the same
way, if we conceive of language as a way of
categorizing the world, then what Levinson
et al. have shown is that languages differ in
the way that they categorize the spatial
domain. They do not claim that speakers
could not use other ways of categorizing
space; it is just that, habitually, they do not.
Second, Gallistel wrote that all brains
encode spatial relations in the same way:
this is because humans share common
sensory and perceptual apparatus. In the
same way, novices and experts share the
same sensory and perceptual apparatus,
and yet when the two groups view identical
stimuli there are differences in the brain
regions activated [10]. How are spatial
concepts represented in the brain? We have
yet to establish which brain regions are
involved in the conceptual representations
of intrinsic, relative and absolute frames of
reference. It is a step further still, to show
how neuronal representations differ, or are
similar, between speakers with different
frames of reference.
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The difference between conception and
perception is murky. When I perceive an
object to lie to the right of the sagittal
plane of my head, do I necessarily conceive
it to occupy that position in that frame of
reference? Is it possible that I perceive it
in that frame but conceive of it in another
frame? The answer depends on what one
understands concepts to be and how one
imagines that they relate to percepts.
That is murky and contentious ground.
Somewhat less murky and contentious are
the following questions: 
(1) Do different spatial frames of reference
govern our actions under different
(non-linguistic) circumstances? 
(2) Can the frequency with which a given
frame of reference is invoked in our daily
language determine which frame of
reference we base our actions on, 
in some circumstances? 
(3) Are any such effects greater than the
effects of the general usefulness of a
given frame of reference where one
happens to be acting? 
(4) Which way does causality flow? 
For example, do people living mostly
outdoors on the side of a hill orient
objects with respect to the hill because
they so often refer to its slope in their
everyday speech? Or do they so often
refer to its slope because it is so often 
the relevant frame for their actions,
including the actions of placing polarized
(orientable) objects like hoes and rakes?
It seems likely that the answer to 
(2) is yes. However, I take the answer to
(1) to be yes, also, and that is what Li and
Gleitman demonstrated [1]. Different
frames of reference govern the actions of
ourselves and non-linguistic animals
under different circumstances. That
seems clear and certain. It would take
more than another experiment to convince
me that Dutch mariners are so
conceptually imprisoned by their frequent
use of egocentric spatial locutions that
they cannot orient their ship in an
absolute frame of reference. In short, the
claim by Majid [2] that ‘no environmental
manipulation made Dutch speakers change
to an absolute coding of space’ cannot be
taken to imply that no environmental
manipulation could make them do so.
The well-established fact that
non-linguistic circumstances can determine
the frame of reference that governs animal
and human actions suggests non-Whorfian
answers to questions (3) and (4). It also
makes me skeptical of the empirical validity
of the claim that ‘some languages use only
one of these [frames of reference].’ [2]. 
If English or Dutch speakers only ever used
an egocentric frame of reference, then we
should have to rename the East River 
‘The River In Front of You When You Stand
on Manhattan Facing Brooklyn.’Before I
believe that Tzeltal speakers use only
absolute spatial terms (and, moreover, 
do not distinguish the two ends of the
transverse axis), I want to read transcripts
of Tzeltal travelers phoning home to tell
their mothers which leg they have broken.
If, as I believe, there are words or simple
locutions in every language for every spatial
frame of reference relevant to the daily
actions of its speakers, then the direction-of-
causality question becomes central.
Mariners the world over, whatever their
native language, talk and act in accordance
with a ship-based frame of reference
(fore–aft, starboard–port), but the rest of us
do not. Such is the power of circumstance.
C.R. Gallistel
Rutgers Center for Cognitive Science,
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